In this paper, we study a large sample of 507 privatization offerings from 39 countries over the period 1979-1996. Our objectives are twofold. First, we document the extent of short-run underpricing of these privatization offerings and measure their variation across countries, industries, and years, as well as drawing comparisons to private company IPOs. Second, we test alternative explanations of the determinants of short-run underpricing drawing on various models of maximizing behavior by underwriters. Overall, we find support for elements of asymmetric information theory, investor sentiment theory and the reputation building hypothesis. Thus to a significant degree, the investment banking strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private companies in industrial countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of state-ownedenterprises in both industrial and lesser developed economies. While other studies have presented evidence for a political explanation for the short-run underpricing effect, our evidence is consistent with proceeds or value maximization in privatization IPOs.
Introduction
Previous empirical research has found that initial public offerings (IPOs) tend to be underpriced leading to positive initial short-run returns. Until recently, these studies focused exclusively on the IPOs of privately (or closely) held enterprises primarily in developed financial markets, and to some degree in smaller markets.
1 Because these IPOs are transactions among private agents, theories of underpricing relied on some form of market failure, usually related to asymmetric information.
Since the late 1970s, the transformation of formerly state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) has provided another important source for IPOs.
Privatization of SOEs was a key element of Margaret Thatcher's economic strategy for the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. Since then, privatization has expanded across other developed countries as well as smaller developing economies. For the period 1988 , Sader (1995 reports 2,655 privatization transactions (including private sales and public offerings) across 95 countries that generated total issue proceeds of US$271 billion. Our own analysis covering 1970-1996 finds $510 billion raised through public share offerings 1 One of the first studies of the U.S. IPO market is Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) . Recent studies incorporating larger sample sizes include Ritter (1991) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) . See Loughran, et al. (1994) for a study of IPO performance for 15 industrial and 9 developing countries.
(excluding private sales). Recently, the OECD (1998) estimated that proceeds from privatization sales reached $153 billion in 1997 alone, with about $69 billion raised through public offerings.
Very few papers have analyzed the behavior of returns on privatization
IPOs or the determinants of these returns. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) study 109 privatization IPOs (64 from four developed countries and 45 from four emerging markets). The authors conclude that on average the initial returns of privatization IPOs and private company IPOs are similar. In addition, the authors find that privatization initial returns depend significantly on several country, industry and offer-specific variables. However, as government is part of every privatization IPO, the authors caution that their evidence is also consistent with theories that emphasize various political objectives. Jones, et al. (1998) examine a larger sample of privatizations (630 episodes from 59 countries) and find evidence of underpricing (on average). For a smaller sub-sample of 93 episodes, the authors report significant variation in underpricing across firms which they attribute to various political and economic objectives of governments.
In this paper, we study a comparably large sample of 507 privatization offerings from 39 countries over the period [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Our objectives are twofold. First, we document the extent of short-run underpricing of these privatization offerings and measure their variation across countries, industries, and years, as well as drawing comparisons to private company IPOs. Second, we test alternative explanations of the determinants of short-run underpricing drawing on various models of maximizing behavior by underwriters.
Overall, we find support for elements of the investor sentiment theory and the reputation building hypothesis. Thus to a significant degree, the investment banking strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private companies in industrial countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of state-ownedenterprises in both industrial and lesser developed economies. While other studies have presented evidence for a political explanation for the short-run underpricing effect, our evidence is consistent with proceeds or value maximization in privatization IPOs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by presenting an overview of the privatization process, drawing attention to those factors that distinguish an IPO for a state-owned-enterprise from an IPO for a private company. In section 3, we review the theoretical literature on underpricing in IPOs and highlight the most relevant empirical evidence. We describe our data and methodology in section 4. And we present our empirical results on the variation in IPO returns and their determinants in section 5.
Concluding comments and comparisons with other studies are in the final section.
An Overview of Privatization

a. Economic and Political Forces
Privatization is the modern word used to describe the transfer of the ownership and control of productive assets from government hands to the private sector. Various procedures including the outright sale of assets, industry deregulation, and out-sourcing various government services to private firms all fall within the scope of privatization. In this paper, we focus only on the sale of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) to private investors.
The German government's sale of an 80% stake in automaker In emerging markets, the debt crises of the 1980s led to a number of market-oriented reforms. Many of these countries saw foreign capital inflows as the engine of growth, and they were willing to relax controls on foreign ownership in exchange. The break-up of the Soviet Union and freeing of Eastern
European economies led to a wave of privatization as productive assets were either closed down or restructured and spun off. 
Theory and Empirical Regularities on Initial Public Offerings
The empirical literature on IPOs has established three stylized empirical regularities. The first, known as the "new issue anomaly," is that IPOs are on average substantially underpriced in early market trading. The second regularity is the existence of "hot issue" (in which average initial returns are unusually high) and "cold issue" markets (in which the opposite is observed). The third empirically regularity focuses on long-run returns for IPOs, where it has typically been found that over a period of several months to several years, the abnormal returns relative to a benchmark portfolio are usually significantly negative. Our focus in this paper is on short-run underpricing.
a. International Evidence on Short-run Underpricing
The IPO market in the United States has been examined extensively.
Studies of U.S. IPOs report that average initial returns are near 15% with most estimates in the 10-20% range. In an early study of 2,650 IPOs in the 1960s, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Malaysia (where underpricing was most severe) imposed bindings constraints on the offer price. Loughran, et al. (1994) argue that in their study, underpricing is generally greater where the offering price is set prior to obtaining information about demand. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) confirm that underpricing is greater the longer the time between setting the offering price and the initial market trade date.
The "hot issue" ("cold issue") regularity was documented initially for the U.S. market by Ibbotson (1975) , and reconfirmed by Ritter (1984) . Loughran, et al. (1994) show that a similar correlation between the level of stock prices and IPO volume is also often found in markets outside of the United States. The tendency for a high volume of IPOs to follow periods of abnormally high market returns could reflect a combination of positive feedback trading from investors and opportunistic behavior by corporate issuers. The general pattern indicates that issuers or underwriters are able to successfully time their offerings when the market is optimistic about IPOs in general and when the demand for IPOs is high, in order to achieve a smooth distribution of shares and raise a large amount of capital.
b. Alternative Theories of IPO Underpricing
An initial public offering of securities brings together the current owners of the firm, a financial intermediary (the underwriter), and a set of potential new shareholders all within a particular institutional framework. Various theories of underpricing have been proposed that focus on one or more of the players in the IPO process. We summarize the most important theoretical models that attempt to explain the empirical regularities in the conventional new issue market.
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(1) Principal-Agent Theory and Costly Monitoring Baron's (1982) 4 An additional theory proposed by Tinic (1988) is that underpricing represents a form of insurance against legal liability for the issuer in the event that the firm does not perform well.
Clearly the legal liability of issuers differs from country to country. And the legal liability hypothesis has been questioned even for the U.S. markets. See Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) . (2 Empirical evidence (Koh and Walter, 1989 and Michaely and Shaw, 1993) generally confirms the major implications and predictions of Rock's model. In the case of privatization sales, it can be argued that SOEs are usually large, wellknown firms and governments make genuine efforts to provide the general public with information prior to the public offering. While these efforts might result in information asymmetry for privatization IPOs that is no greater than (and possibly less than) for conventional IPOs. On the other hand, privatization IPOs may harbor additional uncertainties related to the governments commitment to the privatization process, it commitment to market-based reforms, and the ability of the new managers to make the transition to a competitive market system.
Governments, as partial owners after an IPO, may still exercise some control over the day-to-day operation of the firm, and act to reach political goals rather than act for the benefit of shareholders. Moreover, the scale of many privatization sales may pose an additional risk (for underwriters with scarce capital) that provides an additional incentive for underpricing.
(3) Reputation Building Hypothesis
Because underpricing is costly to the issuing firm, firms have an incentive to reveal their low-risk character to the market. Carter and Manaster (1990) theorize that one way for firm to signal their quality is by selecting underwriters with high prestige. The authors offer empirical evidence that underwriter prestige is positively associated with the marketing of low risk IPOs.
The notion of reputation building might also apply to firms or governments that make repeated public offerings of securities. In this context, it is in the interest of those firms and governments to gain a reputation as a good issuer.
This theme summarizes the signaling hypothesis, which we discuss next.
(4) Signaling Theory
Signaling theory applies to an issuer who intends to sell shares through an initial public offering and subsequent (seasoned) public offerings. Given the existence of both good and bad firms and asymmetric information, investors will value a signal that the IPO is from a good firm. A good firm can afford to signal by underpricing its IPO, because only good firms can be expected to recoup their initial loss after their true performance is realized. By bearing a large initial cost, good firms can credibly signal their type. Bad firms run the risk that their true type will be realized, and so they cannot afford to signal.
Signaling theory relates directly to the discussion of privatization IPOs.
The selling government is a large issuer who is likely to return to the IPO market more often than any individual firm. A privatization program sets the government on course to sell dozens and possibly hundreds of public assets in a sequence.
Given the scale of some SOEs, the government may begin with an IPO for a partial stake in the firm, followed by one or more seasoned offering for the remainder.
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The signaling hypothesis predicts that a selling government should use underpricing of the initial public offering, along with a partial/gradual sales strategy to send a credible signal to the market and maximize the gross proceeds from its overall privatization program. Earlier studies (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988) find that seasoned issues in the British privatization program experience less underpricing than the IPOs.
(5) Investor Sentiment Theories
The theories reviewed so far focus on the IPO price, and appeal to rational or equilibrium models to generate underpricing. The investor sentiment approach focuses instead on after-market pricing, and argues that irrational investor over-optimism may drive up the prices for IPOs resulting in the underpricing that is so well documented in the literature. When investor demand for IPOs is subject to "fads" rather than on valuation based on fundamentals, investor sentiment leads to initial underpricing. 7 Investor sentiment links easily to the cycle of "hot" and "cold" IPO markets. And, as well, if the initial underpricing effect is based on initial over optimism, this helps to reconcile the long-run underperformance of IPOs.
7 The investor sentiment story can be fleshed out further by considering the impact of noise traders and other uninformed investors in the context of risks that limit arbitrage and pricing to fundamentals. See Shleifer and Summers (1990).
Data Sources, Empirical Methodology and Hypotheses
a. The Sample Data
The data on privatization transactions were assembled from several sources. Nearly half of our sample reflects transactions in non-Western European countries. A complete list of offerings and issue proceeds by country is in Table   2 .
The industry patterns for our sample are detailed in Table 3 . The median offering size in infrastructure industries is $488 million, or at least twice what we observe in financial services or primary sector firms, and ten times or more greater than offerings in industrial manufacturing and other industries.
Infrastructure itself appears to be dominated by offerings from telecommunications and utilities, where the median offering size in our sample is $932 million and $700 million respectively.
b. Empirical Methodology
To analyze the short-run underpricing effect, we compute the initial return.
For an IPO, the initial return on stock i is defined as the percentage return from the offering price to the first market price available:
where P i1 is the first market price of stock i and P i0 is the official offer price. In most cases, we are able to determine the exact listing date of the IPO and the
closing price at the end of the first trading day is used for P i1 . The initial return is not adjusted for overall market movements.
For a seasoned offer, the initial return is calculated similarly. We take the going market price on the announcement day as P i0 and the first market price after the seasoned offer as P i1 . For seasoned offerings, the Privatisation International database is our primary source for P i0 .
Given the eclectic nature of theories of IPO underpricing, our initial tests examine the differences across mean initial returns for various sub-samples.
These test comparisons draw mostly on the theories of reputation building, asymmetric information and investor sentiment.
In order to control for some of the factors that may effect initial returns, we also propose a multivariate regression model. The dependent variable is the actual initial return (r i0 ) as a proxy for the expected degree of underpricing. The explanatory variables include the volatility of aftermarket prices (as a risk measure), the stock market trend in the month prior to offering (as an investor sentiment indicator), the issue size of the offering, the percentage allocation to foreign investors, an OECD dummy variable, and five industry sector dummies.
The cross sectional regression model is: As we discuss in the next section, the empirical results for equation (2) shed light on the role played by reputation building, asymmetric information and investor sentiment theories for pricing privatization offerings.
Empirical Results
a. Hypotheses Based on a Comparison of Mean Initial Returns
Based on our sample of 507 privatization transactions, we were able to compute initial returns on 297 issues as shown In Table 4 . Across all 297 issues, the mean initial return was 25.6% while the median was 10.0%, suggesting that the distribution of initial returns is skewed to the right .
IPOs versus Seasoned Offerings
Both the reputation building and asymmetric information theories are relevant for comparing returns on IPOs versus seasoned offerings. The reputation building hypothesis postulates that the issuer (in our case, the government) builds credibility by following a carefully designed privatization plan. The plan may involve a series of stages, including partial privatization in an early stage, as a way for the government to signal the investment community. In the reputation building scenario, the government makes a commitment to its privatization policy. Shareholders benefit from underpricing in the early stages, so that later offerings (both of seasoned offerings of already partially-privatized firms and new IPOs) are more enthusiastically received. If the reputation building hypothesis is correct, IPOs will on average be more underpriced that seasoned offerings.
However, asymmetric information theory also predicts that the expected underpricing of high-risk offerings should be greater than for lower risk offerings.
For IPOs, the relevant measure of uncertainty is not systematic, beta-type risk but rather the gross uncertainty regarding the aftermarket price. Because there is no prior trading history for stocks of privatized firm, uncertainty (and therefore underpricing) should be greater for a privatization IPO than for a seasoned offering.
To test for these effects, we split the sample between IPOs and seasoned offerings. For 220 IPOs we estimate a mean initial return of 32.1% and for 77 seasoned offerings a mean initial return on 7.17%. Using a two-sample t-test that allows for unequal sample sizes and sample variances, we find that the initial return on IPOs is significantly higher than on seasoned offerings at the 1% level. 10 Table 4 also reports mean initial returns for all issues, returns for IPOs only, and returns for seasoned offerings broken down by geographic region.
Except for Canada, we observe a similar finding with the initial returns on IPOs greater than for seasoned offerings. Where sample sizes permit, a t-test confirms that these differences are significant. These findings lend support to both the reputation building and asymmetric information theories.
Privatization IPOs versus Conventional IPOs
Because both asymmetric information and reputation building theories predict that IPOs should be more underpriced than seasoned offerings, we
propose an additional test to distinguish the relevance of these two theories. As On the other hand, the owners of a SOE (i.e. the government) may use underpricing to build their reputation for later stages of their privatization program, or to achieve other political goals (such as wider share ownership).
Therefore, the reputation building hypothesis predicts greater underpricing in privatization IPOs (ceteris paribus) than for conventional IPOs.
For those countries with three or more privatization IPOs and a prior study of the returns to conventional IPOs, we compare the returns on privatization and conventional IPOs.
11 Some studies of conventional IPOs report only the mean initial return and not the variance, and so we are limited to calculating a simple ttest as in Table 5 Panel A . 12 Other studies also report the variance of initial returns, which allows us to compute a two-sample t-test as in Table 5 Panel B.
The results are mixed. For the United Kingdom, France and Singapore, mean initial returns for privatization IPOs are greater than for conventional IPOs.
In the United Kingdom and France, privatization IPOs have outperformed conventional IPOs by about 5-6 percentage points, and in Singapore the difference has been more than 11 percentage points. The results are highly 11 We lack data on conventional IPOs to make comparisons with our results on privatization IPOs for Austria (9 firms with IPO returns), Turkey (21), Argentina (5), Hungary (4) Table 5 (Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, and Malaysia), the results are reversed with greater mean initial returns for conventional IPOs compared with privatization IPOs. The differences in returns for Germany, Italy and Canada are significantly negative. These results do not permit us to distinguish clearly between the asymmetric information and reputation building hypotheses.
Developed Countries versus Developing Countries
In countries with well-developed capital markets there are often more professional security analysts and more efficient information dissemination mechanisms. This suggests that information asymmetry would be less severe in these countries and uncertainty regarding the intrinsic value of a privatized firm lower. Previous research has found that mean initial returns are lower in countries with well-developed capital markets. Our own results ( Table 4 ), showed that initial returns can vary considerably across geographic regions.
We divide our sample countries between OECD and non-OECD countries and test the difference in initial returns using a formal two-sample t-test. Our results are in Table 6 . Initial returns for 100 privatization offerings in non-OECD countries average 58.1% compared to only 9.4% for 198 privatization offerings in OECD countries. If we restrict the sample to only IPOs, the comparison is now 65.9% initial returns in non-OECD countries versus 11.1% initial returns in OECD countries. These differences are highly significant and provide strong evidence favoring the asymmetric information theory.
Early versus Later Privatization IPOs
The reputation building hypothesis predicts that the average underpricing for early privatization IPOs should be greater than for privatization IPOs that are scheduled later. This prediction assumes that to enhance the success of a privatization program, the government may deliberately underprice IPOs to attract both institutional and retail investors. Reputation is enhanced by greater underpricing in early IPOs than in later IPOs.
Our sample permits us to investigate the pattern of returns over time within countries. For those countries with four or more IPOs, we compare the mean of early IPOs (defined as the first N i /2) with later IPOs. The results in Table 7 show no systematic and significant pattern. For Poland, early initial returns average 210.0% and are far greater than later initial returns (54.0%), but the difference is not significant. The results are reversed for Malaysia where later initial returns reach 81.9% and exceed early initial returns by 16.5%.
Pooling the results across countries produces a sample of 218 IPOs. In this sample, early IPO returns average 39.4% beating out later IPO returns of only 24.5%, but the difference is not significant. These broad results are consistent with a theory of reputation building, but the results do not show a consistent and significant pattern.
We also investigated the pattern of IPO initial returns aggregated across countries on a year-by-year basis. These results are shown in Table 8 . Both 1987 and 1993 stand out as years with high mean and median returns relative to our sample. And correspondingly, 1988 and 1995 stand out as years with low mean and median returns. We reject that mean initial returns are identical across years. The smaller underpricing of IPOs in 1988 and 1995 (relative to the sample mean) is significant at the 95% level. In this sense, we can label 1988 and 1995 as "cold issue" years for privatization IPOs.
b. Hypotheses Based on Regression Analysis of Mean Initial Returns
We estimated equation (2) to examine the marginal impact of several factors on initial returns conditional on other variables. Based on the various theories we have discussed, the expected signs of the coefficients are as follows:
When aftermarket standard deviation of returns is an adequate proxy for ex ante uncertainty, asymmetric information theory predicts a positive relationship between risk and initial returns.
Investor sentiment theory predicts that initial returns are higher when the stock market has recently shown an upward trend.
According to asymmetric information theory, it is reasonable to expect that there should be less uncertainty about larger firms, as they are likely to be followed by more analysts, produce more information about their activities, and possibly have longer periods of operation. On the other hand, many privatizations occur in smaller capital markets with less promise for placing larger deals. If capacity is limited, larger issues will require greater underpricing to be placed. This "capital market capacity" hypothesis predicts that a higher degree of underpricing is required for a larger privatization offering, so that the coefficient b 3 is positive (b 3 > 0).
Reputation building predicts that underpricing is a tool that the government can use to build public support for a privatization program, underpricing also represents a wealth transfer from the state to shareholders. For a given level of underpricing, governments will be more subject to criticism the greater is the foreign allocation. Initial returns should be lower as foreign allocation rises.
The asymmetric information theory predicts less underpricing in markets with more professional security analysts and information dissemination.
The asymmetric information theory predicts that initial returns should be higher for those industries (j = 6,10) that are more susceptible to greater risk through government regulation.
Along with the data we have used to this point, to estimate equation (2), we also require one month of aftermarket stock prices to estimate the risk of the security. This requirement reduces our effective sample size. Our results are shown in Table 9 .
Specifications 1-4 define the size variable as the market of each issue relative to the market value of the domestic market in local currency terms. In each of these equations, the coefficient of lagged market returns is positive Adding data on the percentage foreign allocation allows us to test another aspect of reputation building, but unfortunately data limitations reduce the sample size to 67 observations. Indeed, the coefficient of the foreign allocation variable is negative and significant (b 4 <0), but now the OECD dummy and size variables are insignificant and the overall performance of the equations is worse.
Conclusions
Over the last 20 years, privatization has become an important means for transferring ownership from government hands into the hands of private owners.
While privatization sales have many things in common with conventional initial public offerings of privately-held companies, we have argued that there are differences with respect to the objectives of the government owners, in the age, size, and riskiness of the companies, and in the securities markets where the IPO shares are likely to be sold and traded. These differences suggest that the underpricing of privatization IPOs could be more severe than for conventional
IPOs. Moreover, these differences could suggest that a new theory is needed to explain the pattern of initial returns on privatization IPOs.
In this paper, we have argued that traditional theories -of asymmetric information, reputation building, and investor sentiment -that are used to model the behavior of conventional IPOs can also be applied to privatization IPOs. We presented evidence on a large sample of recent privatization IPOs. We compared the underpricing of these IPOs to underpricing in conventional IPOs.
And we presented univariate tests of differences in means across sub-samples of IPOs and the results of multivariate regression analysis.
Overall, our results provide much support for elements of the traditional theories of asymmetric information, reputation building, and investor sentiment.
Consistent with these theories, we find that initial returns on privatization IPOs are significantly less than on seasoned offerings. And we find that underpricing is less in privatizations in OECD countries, and other sub-samples of more developed countries. We find evidence for "cold issue" markets for privatizations after the 1987 stock market crash and 1994 Mexican financial crisis. Our regression analysis confirms that recent market performance, issue size and foreign allocation are significant determinants of underpricing.
Less encouraging, we find no consistent evidence that the underpricing of privatization IPOs differs from conventional IPOs. Nor do we find that expected risk, as proxied by actual future standard deviation of returns is a significant variable explaining IPO underpricing.
Despite these last findings, we conclude that the traditional theories of IPO underpricing help explain many of the patterns we observe in pricing privatization IPOs. Thus to a significant degree, the investment banking strategies believed to characterize IPOs of private companies in industrial countries may also play a role in the IPO strategies of state-owned-enterprises in both industrial and lesser developed economies. While other studies have presented evidence for a political explanation for the short-run underpricing effect, our evidence is consistent with proceeds or value maximization in privatization IPOs. Note: P-val in column (6) indicate that the two sample mean differences for each country and for the total sample are not statistically significant at any conventional level. 
